Writing in the British newspaper The Guardian in June 2012, an emeritus professor of international banking and finance at Barcelona's prestigious ESADE business school gave his own verdict on the roots of the crisis:
Spain's banking crisis did not come out of the blue. In the 1990s the Spanish suffered a bout of collective madness. Interest rates fell from 14 per cent (with the peseta) to 4 per cent (with the euro) in a matter of weeks. In 1998 the centre-right government passed a law that significantly increased the amount of land for development. Developers got rich, selling the idea that everyone was going to win because property would always go up -never down -in value. German banks financed Spain's savings and commercial banks, which needed extra funds for high-risk mortgages. Greed made us rich for a while -but then it made us poor, and jeopardised our future.
He elaborates:
All of these bubbles were like fires lit by greed: you could buy a flat on the Mediterranean coast (or in a city) for £100,000 and sell it the next day for £150,000; by the end of the month it was worth £250,000. And meanwhile, the flat, purchased off-plan, was still being built. The last buyer still believed that prices would never stop spiralling upward. All this began in 1998, and the bubble burst in 2007. Nine years of speculative madness. (Tornabell, 2012) The crisis, in this reading, was a product of human frailty, gullibility, and greed.
The Limits to Urbanisation
Crisis, as we have explained and demonstrated thus far, is necessary to the capitalist form of social production. The periodicity of crisis can be understood as a result of the tendency toward overaccumulation. We have seen how successive crises and subsequent periods of devaluation managed by the Spanish state have transformed Spanish capitals, prefigured the uneven development of different branches of production within Spain, and fragmented labour markets. In Chapter 3, we argued that the development of industry in Spain -as a constitutive moment of the uneven development of the forces of production within Europe and at a global scale -could not have provided a basis for the sustained period of growth and the expansion of social consumption that transpired from the mid-1990s until 2008. In this chapter, we therefore turn to the material bases of the boom that preceded the present crisis. Although we concede that Tornabell and others are correct to focus their attention upon the crucial role of construction and the real estate market as a sphere for speculative investment in the last Spanish boom (see, for instance, Bielsa and Duarte, 2011; IMF, 2009; OECD, 2010; Salmon, 2010) , we develop a materialist account of the significance of urbanisation that is consistent with the value theoretical approach adopted and the historical account developed in preceding chapters (see also Burnham, 2011: 494-8) . In order to most effectively trace the inner relation between the limits to capital accumulation in Spain and the role of construction and real estate markets in the overaccumulation of capital, we draw upon Marxian scholarship on the urban process in capitalism.
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Theorising the urban process in contemporary capitalism
Urbanisation, understood simply in terms of 'city formation and the production, appropriation, and concentration of an economic surplus' (Harvey, 1985b: 191) , is by no means historically specific to capitalism. However, it is the case that in the course of the historical development of the productive forces, urban centres became crucial to the spatial organisation of capitalist production, and reproduction in specific ways. In short, urbanisation takes on a specifically capitalist meaning as soon as it is acknowledged that it takes on an active role in the processes of uneven geographical development and the overaccumulation and devaluation of capital. Today, then, urbanisation -and with it geographical locality and place -should be considered in relation to the necessity of crisis in capitalism, if only because, as Harvey (1982: 425) stresses, crises 'always fuse the particular and the individual (concrete
